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ABSTRACT  
   
Environmental agencies often want to accomplish additional objectives 
beyond their central environmental protection objective. This is laudable; 
however it begets a need for understanding the additional challenges and trade-
offs involved in doing so. The goal of this thesis is to examine the trade-offs 
involved in two such cases that have received considerable attention recently. The 
two cases I examine are (1) the protection of multiple environmental goods (e.g., 
bundles of ecosystem services); and (2) the use of payments for ecosystem 
services as a poverty reduction mechanism. In the first case (chapter 2), I build a 
model based on the fact that efforts to protect one environmental good often 
increase or decrease the levels of other environmental goods, what I refer to as 
“cobenefits” and “disbenefits” respectively. There is often a desire to increase the 
cobenefits of environmental protection efforts in order to synergize across 
conservation efforts; and there is also a desire to decrease disbenefits because they 
are seen as negative externalities of protection efforts. I show that as a result of 
reciprocal externalities between environmental protection efforts, environmental 
agencies likely have a disincentive to create cobenefits, but may actually have an 
incentive to decrease disbenefits. In the second case (chapter 3), I model an 
environmental agency that wants to increase environmental protection, but would 
also like to reduce poverty. The model indicates that in theory, the trade-offs 
between these two goals may depend on relevant parameters of the system, 
particularly the ratio of the price of monitoring to participant’s compliance cost. I 
show that when the ratio of monitoring costs to compliance cost is higher, trade-
  ii 
offs between environmental protection and poverty reduction are likely to be 
smaller. And when the ratio of monitoring costs to compliance costs is lower, 
trade-offs are likely to be larger. This thesis contributes to a deeper understanding 
of the trade-offs faced by environmental agencies that want to pursue secondary 
objectives of protecting additional environmental goods or reducing poverty. 
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Chapter 1 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment created a strong guide for 
research related to the environment and human well-being. It established a 
number of key points: (1) Human well-being is closely tied to the benefits 
provided by ecosystems (ecosystem services); (2) many of the services provided 
by ecosystems are in decline; (3) there is a need for increased policy and 
management interventions to reverse the degradation of ecosystems and improve 
human well-being; and (4) in most cases we do not have sufficient understanding 
of ecosystem properties and how they contribute to human well-being to create 
effective interventions for reversing degradation and enhancing ecosystem 
services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
This has spurred interest in addressing these gaps in scientific knowledge 
and increased the demand for effective policy to manage ecosystems (Carpenter et 
al., 2009). In an effort to set the research agenda, considerable work has been 
done to clarify the nature of these gaps in our knowledge about ecosystems and 
their links with human well-being. In general, there has been a call to generate a 
richer understanding of the complex social-ecological context in which 
interactions between humans and ecosystems take place. For example, Carpenter 
et al. (2009) state that “New research is needed that considers the full ensemble of 
processes and feedbacks, for a range of biophysical and social systems, to better 
understand and manage the dynamics of the relationship between humans and the 
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ecosystems on which they rely.” Daily and Matson (2008) come to a similar 
conclusion. They state that advances in the management of ecosystems are needed 
in three key areas: (1) the science of ecosystem service production functions and 
the mapping of services; (2) the design of appropriate finance, policy and 
governing systems; and (3) the art of implementing these [programs] in diverse 
biophysical and social contexts. 
In broad terms, the goal of this thesis is to contribute to the effort to 
understand challenges created by the context in which environmental protection 
efforts take place. In particular it focuses on situations where the biophysical and 
social context of environmental management efforts results in situations where 
there are likely to be multiple policy objectives and a need for understanding the 
trade-offs between these objectives. This thesis takes a partial equilibrium 
approach to examining these trade-offs. More complex impacts on markets and 
other factors that would be captured by a general equilibrium approach are not 
considered here. Specifically, the thesis focuses on two themes where this is the 
case: the management of multiple environmental goods (chapter 1); and efforts to 
use payments for ecosystem services (PES) as poverty alleviation mechanisms. 
The first chapter in this thesis examines challenges faced by efforts to 
protect multiple environmental goods simultaneously. Because the benefits 
humans receive from ecosystems are often closely interconnected and share 
drivers such as land-use change (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; 
Bennett et al., 2009) efforts to protect one environmental good can increase or 
decrease other environmental goods (what I refer to as cobenefits and disbenefits, 
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respectively). This has generated a strong interest in deepening our understanding 
of when environmental protection efforts can achieve multiple environmental 
goals simultaneously and what trade-offs may exist between them. For example, 
the United Nation’s Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD) program has generated considerable interest in this regard. 
Venter et al. (2009) and Miles and Kapos (2008) both call for increasing the 
extent to which the massive transfer of money toward tropical nations increases 
biodiversity protection and other ecosystem services, not just carbon 
sequestration. 
Considerable work has been done to identify, map and value multiple 
ecosystem services. For example, there is a variety of papers that seek to guide 
conservation by illustrating where on the landscape bundles of ecosystem services 
are produced, and thus where it might be best to focus conservation investments 
(e.g., Chan et al., 2006; Egoh et al., 2008; Naidoo et al., 2008). Spatially explicit 
modeling tools for conservation planning, such as InVEST (Nelson et al., 2009), 
have also been developed. InVEST uses ecological production functions and 
economic valuation techniques to assess the outcomes for multiple ecosystem 
services under different land-use/land-cover projections. Tools such as InVEST 
represent a significant step forward in coordinating conservation planning so that 
it takes into account the complex biophysical and social elements pertinent to 
effective environmental management. 
While there has been considerable progress in conservation planning 
related to cobenefits and disbenefits, there is still a need for greater understanding 
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of the challenges inherent in pursuing multiple policy objectives in this context. 
To contribute to this understanding, the first chapter in this thesis models a 
situation where there are two environmental agencies, each seeking to reach a 
fixed environmental goal for a different environmental good. In the model, 
protection efforts of each agency impacts both environmental goods. This allows 
for an examination of the incentives that each agency has to increase the degree to 
which its protection efforts benefit or diminish the second environmental good. 
The model shows that this situation results in reciprocal externalities between the 
two environmental agencies, which may create challenges for efforts to increase 
cobenefits and decrease disbenefits of environmental protection efforts. In this 
sense, the model highlights social feedbacks that may results from the context in 
which environmental protection efforts take place. 
The second chapter of this thesis focuses on efforts to achieve 
environmental protection in locations where there is also concern about reaching 
development goals. The chapter considers a case where there is an environmental 
agency that would like to increase environmental protection, but would also like 
to achieve a reduction in poverty levels where the program is located. Naturally 
the goals of environmental protection and poverty reduction are both important 
goals; however there is a need to understand when these goals may overlap and 
what trade-offs exist between them. 
The hope of achieving environmental protection and poverty reduction 
simultaneously is not new. Indeed, there is a long history of interconnections 
between environmental protection efforts and rural development initiatives. 
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Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is one example of 
this. The latter part of the twentieth century saw a sharp rise in efforts by national 
governments and conservation and development agencies to strengthen local 
institutional capacity in an effort to improve environmental management and 
stimulate rural development simultaneously. One common example of a CBNRM 
program is Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), which was designed in the mid-1980s to 
stimulate rural development by devolving to communities the rights to manage 
and benefit from natural resource such as large game and their habitat (Frost & 
Bond, 2008; Taylor, 2009). CBNRM programs have met with mixed success. In 
some cases, such as that of CAMPFIRE, there have been identifiable 
improvements in wildlife management and economic gains for the community, 
however in many cases programs have had little identifiable success or there is 
too little information about revenue and community costs to determine the net 
effect of the program (Gibson & Marks, 1995). 
More recently market-like payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
programs have become the mechanism of choice for environmental protection 
efforts in the developing world (Wunder, 2007). Not surprisingly, there is also 
hope that PES programs will function as rural development mechanisms. In 
general, PES programs work by offering landowners financial or in-kind 
compensation for managing lands in a way that ensures the provision of some 
environmental good. More specifically, Wunder (2005) defines a properly 
functioning PES as, “a voluntary transaction where a well-defined ES [ecosystem 
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service] (or a land-use likely to secure that service) is being ‘bought’ by a 
(minimum one) ES buyer from a (minimum one) ES provider if and only if the 
provider secures ES provision (conditionality).” Because PES programs provide 
an income source to the landowners, there has been hope that PES would achieve 
environmental conservation and rural development simultaneously (Engel et al., 
2008). However, as with the case of CBNRM, the value of PES as a poverty 
alleviation mechanism is highly context dependent, and thus far only limited 
success has been documented (Pagiola et al., 2005; Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 
2008). 
Given the history of conservation and development efforts, the need to 
understand the trade-offs between environmental protection and poverty 
alleviation has been recognized for some time. However for a variety of reasons, 
there is an increasing urgency for understanding these trade-offs in the context of 
PES. One reason is that the perceived need for environmental protection in 
developing countries is increasing, particularly as climate change becomes a 
larger focus of environmental efforts. A significant portion of global carbon 
emissions come from deforestation in developing countries (DeFries et al., 2002). 
This has spurred an increased effort to reduce threats to carbon stocks in poorer 
nations, such as the UN’s proposed Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD) program. REDD, which would provide financial 
incentives to countries to reduce their deforestation rates, would involve an 
unprecedented transfer of money to developing countries (Venter et al., 2009 ), 
and much of these funds would likely be channeled into PES-like mechanisms 
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(Pattanayak et al., 2010). In addition, because the benefit of carbon emission 
reductions is essentially independent of the location of the emission reductions, 
carbon credit markets can target wherever emission abatement can be achieved at 
lowest cost, which may incentivize industries from developed countries to 
purchase offsets derived from reduced deforestation in developing countries. 
The increased flow of conservation dollars to poor countries and the 
growing interest in achieving environmental and poverty goals simultaneously 
means there is a strong need for understanding the trade-offs between these goals. 
The possibility that “pro-poor premia” on environmental efforts that also achieve 
poverty reduction may increase the amount of funding available for 
environmental protection (Greig-Gran et al., 2005) provides even further 
motivation. To help address this need, the second chapter in this thesis generates 
some theoretical insights by modeling a PES program where the environmental 
agency seeks to achieve both an environmental protection goal and a poverty 
reduction goal. This allows for an analysis of when these two goals may overlap 
and when there may be trade-offs. 
In summary, the biophysical and social context of environmental 
management efforts often spurs the desire to address multiple policy objectives at 
the same time. The primary goal of this thesis is to provide some theoretical 
insights about the challenges of achieving multiple policy objectives in the cases 
discussed above, especially the trade-offs that may exist between these objectives. 
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Chapter 2 
MANAGING FOR MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS: THE CASE OF 
COBENEFITS AND DISBENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
EFFORTS 
 
Summary 
Environmental agencies’ efforts to protect one environmental good often 
increase or decrease the levels of other environmental goods as well. I refer to 
these as “cobenefits” and “disbenefits” of environmental protection efforts. There 
is interest in increasing the cobenefits of environmental protection efforts because 
they are seen as a way to synergize across conservation efforts; and there is 
interest in decreasing disbenefits because they are seen as negative externalities of 
protection efforts that could potentially be minimized. Because increasing 
cobenefits and decreasing disbenefits may be a way to increase the efficiency of 
environmental protection efforts, it is important to understand what incentives 
environmental agencies have to increase cobenefits and decrease disbenefits. This 
chapter examines this issue by building a model of two environmental goods and 
two environmental agencies (e.g., environmental NGOs or national governments), 
where each agency is focused on protecting one of the goods. The model is used 
to illustrate how increasing cobenefits and decreasing disbenefits impact the cost 
to the agencies of meeting a fixed environmental target. The model shows that the 
presence of cobenefits and disbenefits results in reciprocal externalities between 
the two agencies’ environmental protection efforts. In the case of cobenefits, it is 
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shown that the agencies have a disincentive to increase cobenefits, whereas in the 
case of disbenefits the agencies have an incentive to decrease disbenefits. This 
work provides some basic theoretical insights pertinent to the management of 
multiple environmental goods when there are cobenefits and disbenefits of 
environmental protection efforts. 
 
Introduction 
It is well understood that efforts to protect one environmental good can 
increase or decrease other environmental goods. For example, efforts to sequester 
carbon by protecting natural forests can also protect biodiversity (and vice 
versa—efforts to protect biodiversity may also sequester carbon). These are often 
called “synergies” between protection efforts, but I will instead use the term 
“cobenefits” of protection efforts because this term is more clear and because this 
is term often used in the international conservation arena (Miles & Kapos, 2008). 
On the other hand, efforts to protect one environmental good may instead 
decrease other environmental goods—often called “trade-offs” between 
protection efforts. I will refer to these as “disbenefits” of conservation efforts. For 
example, Jackson et al. (2005) showed that afforestation (a strategy frequently 
used to sequester carbon) can result in substantial losses in stream flow and 
increased soil salinization. There is a call to increase cobenefits and decrease 
disbenefits; cobenefits are seen as a way to synergize across conservation efforts, 
and disbenefits are seen as negative externalities that should be minimized where 
possible. For example Venter et al. (2009) and Miles & Kapos (2008) both claim 
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that the UN’s REDD program should prioritize carbon sequestration opportunities 
that increase cobenefits like the protection of biodiversity and other ecosystem 
services. 
It seems that there is a need to clarify some of the terminology used when 
discussing so-called “synergies” and “trade-offs” between environmental 
goods/ecosystem services. I think that the terms cobenefits and disbenefits are 
preferred terms for discussing the marginal impacts of conservation efforts. For 
example, supposed the budget dedicated to conservation is increased. If another 
dollar is spent to convert a patch of land from a non-conservation land-use to a 
conservation land-use, these terms help specify how much of two desired 
outcomes (say carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation) is achieved. It 
may be that the net impact of the land-use change increases a targeted 
environmental good and also increases another environmental good (the case of 
cobenefits). Or it may be that the net impact of the land-use change is positive for 
the targeted good but negative for the other good (the case of disbenefits). By 
using these terms, one can differentiate cobenefits and disbenefits from the more 
traditional notion of trade-offs in economics where one is determining how much 
of two desired goods can be produced given scare resources/budget. This 
corresponds to a situation where there is instead a fixed conservation budget and 
one is determining how much of two desired environmental outcomes can be 
achieved given different allocations of the budget. Thus it is possible that for two 
environmental goods generally associated with cobenefits (say, carbon and 
biodiversity), there are still trade-offs between the two goods. It seems to me that 
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this distinction is frequently glossed over in the literature, which obfuscates the 
discussion about protecting multiple ecosystem services/environmental goods. 
Many papers have focused on determining the spatial pattern of cobenefits 
and disbenefits. Frequently these analyses identify areas where there is high 
spatial correlation between ecosystem services or areas that are priorities because 
of their contribution to multiple services. These studies have revealed that in some 
cases ecosystem services are spatially correlated, but that in other cases they may 
not be. For example, Anderson  et al. (2009) map the correlation among areas 
important for biodiversity (richness of species of conservation concern) and other 
ecosystem services in Britain. They found that in some cases, those areas that are 
best for conserving species of concern also overlap with areas important for 
producing other ecosystem services, but in other cases they do not, and that this 
can vary considerably depending on the region of analysis. Chan et al. (2006) find 
that in central coastal California, biodiversity shows a weak positive correlation 
with some services (e.g., water provisioning, carbon storage) and a weak negative 
correlation with other services (pollination and forage production), but that 
strategic selection of associated services shows promise for meeting multiple 
ecosystem service protection goals. In a study focused on identifying bundles of 
ecosystem services in Quebec, Canada Raudsepp-Hearne  et al. (2010) identify 
bundles of ecosystem services by mapping the spatial pattern of 12 ecosystem 
services and make suggestions for maximizing the protection of multiple services. 
They found that there are often trade-offs between provisioning and regulating 
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services, but that greater diversity of ecosystem services is positively correlated 
with regulating ecosystem services. 
Increasing cobenefits and decreasing disbenefits may be a way to increase 
the efficiency of conservation efforts (Nelson et al., 2008) and there is increasing 
information available to environmental agencies interested in doing so. For 
example it may be possible for an environmental agency to sequester carbon via a 
number of different strategies, each with different levels of cobenefits. 
Afforestation using monoculture tree plantations and the reestablishment of native 
forest both increase carbon sequestration, however the two strategies would likely 
result in drastically different cobenefits for other environmental goods such as 
biodiversity (Kanowski et al., 2005). The question then becomes, what incentives 
do environmental agencies have to increase cobenefits or decrease disbenefits? 
The goal of this chapter is to shed some light on these incentives. 
One potential disincentive that environmental agencies may face has 
received considerable attention. Adding secondary goals such as increasing 
cobenefits or decreasing disbenefits might decrease the direct per dollar impact of 
the agency’s spending on the original environmental good they set out to protect. 
For example, Venter  et al. (2009) use land-use maps and species distribution 
maps to model the optimal investment strategy for protecting carbon stocks for 
the UN’s REDD program, given a fixed budget. They then show how this 
investment pattern would change if there were also an emphasis on increasing the 
cobenefits of protecting biodiversity. They find that there are direct trade-offs 
between these two goals, meaning that increasing the biodiversity cobenefits of 
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carbon sequestration efforts would directly decrease the amount of carbon 
sequestered by the program (given a fixed budget), though they note that due to 
nonlinearities in the trade-offs, the direct reduction in carbon sequestered would 
be small at first. They show that these direct trade-offs result from the higher 
opportunity cost of lands that are rich in biodiversity. In an analysis of multiple 
ecosystem services in the Willamette Basin, Oregon, Nelson  et al. (2008) 
similarly find that there are direct trade-offs between carbon sequestration goals 
and species conservation goals. Because these direct trade-offs increase the cost 
per dollar of protecting the original environmental good of interest, they provide a 
disincentive for increasing cobenefits. 
While direct trade-offs have received considerable attention, there may be 
indirect effects of cobenefits and disbenefits that also influence agencies’ 
incentives. To see this, consider the case of a PES program in Los Negros, 
Bolivia. Initially, an international environmental agency created a PES program to 
protect biodiversity, and hoped to eventually collaborate with downstream water-
users who would also benefit from upstream forest protection. However, Asquith 
et al. (2008) found that individual water-users benefiting from hydrological 
services were reluctant to contribute to the program. The authors state the 
problem concisely: “...using biodiversity payments to pump-prime the [PES] 
scheme may also have created a perverse incentive for downstream users—why 
should they pay when someone is already doing it for them?” In this case there 
was an indirect effect created by the cobenefits of the international agency’s 
conservation efforts. The international agency’s protection efforts provided 
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cobenefits of hydrological services.
1
 This disincentivized downstream users from 
investing in environmental protection, which forced the international agency to 
bear most of the costs. 
The impact of these indirect effects on environmental agencies’ incentives 
to provide cobenefits or avoid disbenefits needs to be considered, but has not 
received significant attention. The goal of this model is to create a basic picture of 
how these indirect effects might influence the behavior of environmental agencies 
and what this means for efforts to protect multiple interconnected environmental 
goods. To accomplish this, first a general model of two environmental goods is 
developed. Two environmental agencies are assumed to have an interest in 
protecting these goods. Each of the agencies is tasked with reaching a fixed 
environmental goal for one of the goods. To examine the incentives agencies face 
vis-à-vis increasing cobenefits and decreasing disbenefits, I show how changes in 
the agency’s cobenefits and disbenefits levels would affect the expenditures 
required for them to meet their original environmental goal. The model shows that 
cobenefits and disbenefits may result in strategic behavior on the part of the 
environmental agencies. In the case of cobenefits this is because one agency has 
an incentive to free-ride off the other agency’s cobenefits. Free-riding is a 
common problem with public goods and common-pool resources because benefits 
derived from these goods are non-excludable (Cornes & Sandler, 1996; Sandler, 
2004). It is for this reason that strategic behavior is central to the challenges 
surrounding cobenefits and disbenefits. In particular this model shows that the 
                                                 
1 This situation is analogous to the classic “chicken game” from game theory. For more information and examples see 
Gibbons (1992). 
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existence of cobenefits and disbenefits may results in reciprocal externalities 
between protection efforts. Considerable work has been done on reciprocal 
externalities (e.g., foundational work such as Buchanan and Kafoglis (1963), and 
Vincent (1969)). This model brings existing understanding about public goods, 
common pool resources and reciprocal externalities to bear on the issue of 
protecting multiple environmental goods in the presence of cobenefits and 
disbenefits. 
The scope of this model is limited to those environmental goods that are 
non-exludable (i.e., public goods and common pool resources). For example, this 
would include environmental goods such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity 
conservation, and many watershed services, because these have non-excludable 
benefits such as climate regulation. This also means that the model does not apply 
to goods such as agricultural commodities, which are private goods. This is a 
limitation of the model in that I am not considering cases where the goods are 
characterized by excludability. However, because the inability to exclude users 
creates many of the environmental challenges targeted by environmental 
protection efforts, this work is still broadly applicable. 
 
The Model 
Suppose there are two environmental goods, the values of which are 
denoted 
iG , for 1,2=i , and there are two environmental agencies. The first 
agency has a conservation goal for one of the environmental goods, and the 
second agency has a conservation goal for the other environmental good. The 
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agencies’ goals can be represented as follows: Agency 1 wants to achieve 
11 GG  , and agency 2 wants to achieve 22 GG  . This allows the superscript to 
identify both the agency and its environmental goal. 
This assumption of a fixed environmental target may make sense for some 
environmental agencies and not for others. For example, many governments are 
tasked with reaching set environmental goals (such as a certain water quality 
threshold or specific reductions in deforestation rates such as those proposed in 
REDD). In these cases, once the goal is reached, the agency would likely spend 
additional funds on other initiatives (e.g., other government programs). In the case 
of environmental NGOs it is possible that they would not set a fixed 
environmental goal, but would instead use some other criteria to guide the 
allocation of their funding. Nevertheless, even for environmental NGOs it is 
possible that once a certain level of environmental protection is achieved (say, 
successful stabilization of a vulnerable species), it may cease spending money on 
that initiative, and invest any extra funds on other initiatives that benefit the NGO 
(e.g., environmental protection in another location, increased fund-raising 
activities, etc.). 
Each agency chooses an investment level, ix  ( 1,2=i ), in order to reach 
their respective environmental goal at minimum cost. To allow for the possibility 
of cobenefits and disbenefits, the levels of the two environmental goods are 
determined by both agencies’ investments so that the levels of the two 
environmental goods are ),(= ji
ii xxfG , for 1,2=,iji  . Naturally it must be 
  17 
the case that 0>i
i
xf  (i.e., an agency’s efforts to protect the good that it cares 
about increase the level of that good), however 
i
j
xf  may be positive or negative to 
allow for cobenefits or disbenefits. Cobenefits exist when 0>
i
j
xf  and disbenefits 
exist when 0<
i
j
xf  for 1,2=,iji  . In order for this problem to be reasonable, it 
must be the case that |>|
i
j
x
i
i
x ff , 1,2=,iji  . This ensures two things. In the 
case of cobenefits this ensures the environmental agencies choose the most 
effective conservation spending scheme—it reflects the reasonable assumption 
that they would not chose an inferior protection strategy if there were a better 
strategy available. In the case of disbenefits it avoids the case where it would not 
be possible to simultaneously reach both agencies’ environmental protection goals 
because of the magnitude of the negative externality. 
There are several key assumptions contained within these production 
functions. First, each agencies’ investment is assumed to be non-allocatable and 
non-rivalrous in production. This means that an agency’s investment cannot be 
allocated to one good or another, but rather works toward the production of both. 
Non-rivalry indicates that the contribution of the investment to one good does not 
reduce that investment’s impact on the other good. These are likely to be 
reasonable assumptions when the inputs are dollars dedicated to environmental 
protection by the two agencies. Since agencies are likely to enact conservation 
actions such as land-use changes, it seems reasonable to assume that dollars spent 
converting a plot of land to a new land-use could contribute in a non-rivalrous 
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manner to the production of two environmental goods that derive from the new 
land-use. Another assumption is that the production technologies are non-joint in 
output (Kohli 1981, 1983), meaning that the level of one good does not depend on 
the level of the other good. This assumption may be more restrictive. Given the 
complexity of ecosystems it is likely that the environmental goods themselves 
may influence one another’s production. For example, Diaz et al. (2009) found 
that biodiversity levels influences the long-term storage capacity of carbon stocks. 
In the context of this model, this would mean that the marginal product of efforts 
to sequester carbon could be a function of the level of biodiversity, something this 
specification of production functions does not allow for. A more complete model 
would account for this possibility, however this would not allow for separable 
production functions and would significantly complicate the analysis. Instead, as a 
first step for analyzing this problem, a simpler approach is taken here. Future 
work should consider this issue. 
Each agency wants to achieve its respective environmental target at 
minimum cost. Because each agency’s actions affect both of the environmental 
goods, each agency must take into account the potential actions of the other 
agency when making investment decisions. I assume that the two agencies 
simultaneously make their decisions about how much to invest. It would be 
possible to model this situation as a sequential game where one agency chooses 
its investment level first, and the second agency chooses its investment based on 
the choice of the first agency. Understanding which model (simultaneous vs. 
sequential) is a better model of reality would require an investigation of the 
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context in which the agencies are acting. The goal of this chapter is to establish a 
starting point for analyzing environmental protection efforts in the presence of 
cobenefits and disbenefits, so I will focus on the more tractable case where the 
two agencies choose their investment levels simultaneously. 
For two agencies that choose their investment levels simultaneously, their 
problems are 1,2=,),(=..=0 ijiwhereGxxfGtsxcostsmin
i
ji
ii
i
i
x  . This 
implies that there exist equations ),( iji Gxx  for 1,2=,iji  , which are the best 
response functions for the environmental agencies. These functions can take the 
value of zero (a corner solution), meaning that an agency’s best response is to 
choose zero investment. However, note that even in the case of a corner solution 
for investment, the environmental good is still greater than zero. To see when 
corner solutions may arise, note that agency i ’s investment level tends toward 
zero (a corner solution) when agency j ’s environmental goal is larger in size and 
when the cobenefits of agency j ’s conservation efforts, i
j
xf , are of a larger 
magnitude. In other words, agency i  is more likely to choose to not invest at all if 
agency j  has a large protection goal and produces a high level of cobenefits. This 
is because agency i ’s environmental protection goal will be satisfied even if 
agency i  takes no action. For an interior solution where ix  and jx  are positive, 
each agencies’ constraint will bind. Here we can use the implicit function theorem 
to find 
j
i
x
x


 (Simon & Blume, 1994). If we define 0=),(= ji
ii xxfGH  , then 
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(1) 
 
 This indicates that for cobenefits (when 0>
i
j
xf  ), 0<
j
i
x
x


, meaning that 
agency i  will reduce its investment level as agency j  increases its investment 
level. Because agency i  decreases its protection efforts when agency j  increases 
its efforts, this indicates that in the case of cobenefits, the two agencies’ 
protection efforts are strategic substitutes (Bulow et al., 1985). Alternatively, for 
disbenefits (when 0<
i
j
xf  ), 0>
j
i
x
x


, meaning that agency i  will increase its 
investment level as agency j  increases it investment level. In this case, because 
agency i  increases its protection efforts when agency j  increase its efforts, the 
two agencies’ efforts are strategic complements (Bulow et al., 1985). 
It is important to note how this strategic behavior impacts the additionality 
of the agencies’ protection efforts. (i.e., the additional protection of iG  achieved 
by a marginal increase in spending by agency i ). Using the agencies’ best 
response functions, the levels of the environmental goods can be rewritten as 
1,2=,)),(,(= ijiwherexxxfG iji
ii  . Thus the additionality of agency i ’s 
protection efforts is, 
 
  21 
 
)(=
i
ji
j
x
i
i
x
i
i
x
x
x
ffG


  
(2) 
 
Equation (2) shows how the strategic behavior of the agencies affects the 
additionality of protection efforts. Recall that 
i
j
xf  represents how agency j ’s 
efforts affect iG  and 
j
i
x
x


 represents how agency j  responds to investment by 
agency i . This means that the second term in equation (2) represents the strategic 
feedback due to strategic substitutability or strategic complementarity between the 
agencies’ protection efforts. Thus in the case of cobenefits and disbenefits, 
strategic behavior results in a decrease in the additionality of protection efforts. 
To see this, note that in the case where there are cobenefits of protection efforts 
0>i
j
xf  and 0<
j
i
x
x


. For disbenefits, 0<
i
j
xf  and 0>
j
i
x
x


, making the second 
term negative. For use in the next sections substitute equation (1) into equation (2) 
to yield 
 
 
)(=
j
j
x
j
i
xi
j
x
i
i
x
i
i
x
f
f
ffG   
(3) 
 
First focus on the incentives agencies face with respect to increasing the 
cobenefits of their protection efforts. First assume that there is an interior solution 
where both environmental agencies choose positive investment levels. Agencies 
  22 
have an ability to chose to what extent they can create cobenefits (e.g., Venter et 
al., 2009). To examine what incentive agencies have to increase cobenefits, I will 
show how the costs of reaching the agency’s original environmental goal change 
if the agency undertakes a marginal increase in its level of cobenefits, j
i
xf . As 
noted by Venter et al. (2009) and Nelson et al (2008), there may be direct costs 
associated with increasing cobenefits. However, I will assume direct costs to be 
zero in order to isolate and highlight the indirect costs that result from strategic 
behavior. The assumption that the agency can enact a marginal increase in its 
cobenefits with zero direct costs means that I assume that i
i
xf  does not change 
when there is a marginal increase in the cobenefits level, j
i
xf . An example helps 
clarify what this thought experiment might look like in the real world. Suppose 
there are two carbon sequestration strategies that are equally effective in terms of 
carbon sequestered per dollar, but which have different impacts on biodiversity—
one protects slightly more biodiversity than the other. A marginal increase in the 
cobenefits ( j
i
xf ) in the sense described above is analogous to switching from the 
lower biodiversity strategy to the higher biodiversity strategy. The incentives the 
agency has to make this switch can be seen by looking at the impact of this switch 
on the additionality of protection efforts and the costs of reaching the agency’s 
original environmental goal. 
To see the impact on additionality and costs refer back to equation (3). 
Equation (3) shows that the additional 
iG  achieved by a marginal increase in ix  
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decreases when there is an increase in agency i ’s cobenefits j
i
xf . This is because 
when agency i  increases its cobenefits, this allows agency j  to reduce its 
spending needed to achieve its own conservation goal. This in turn decreases how 
much iG  is provided by agency j ’s cobenefits. As a result, agency i ’s 
conservation dollars add less additional iG , meaning that protection per dollar is 
lower. Thus if environmental agency i  increases it cobenefits, it must also 
increase it conservation expenditures in order to meet its original fixed 
environmental goal. To see this more clearly, consider the case of carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity protection. If an agency endeavoring to meet a 
carbon sequestration target decides to increase the amount of biodiversity its 
carbon sequestration efforts protects (i.e., its cobenefits), this may disincentivize 
individuals who would have otherwise invested in protecting biodiversity. 
Because their biodiversity efforts would likely have contributed to meeting the 
carbon sequestration target, this increases the agency’s cost of meeting the 
original carbon target. It is in this sense that reciprocal positive externalities 
created by cobenefits of conservation efforts may create challenges for protecting 
multiple services. In the presence of cobenefits, environmental agencies may 
actually have a disincentive for increasing cobenefits because they can decrease 
their private cost of achieving their conservation goal by reducing their 
cobenefits. This is also a consideration for efforts to understand how much it will 
cost to reach important environmental targets. For example, in the case of REDD, 
there is great interest in increasing the biodiversity cobenefits. However, it may be 
  24 
necessary to consider how the indirect effects of increasing biodiversity 
cobenefits will increase the costs to national governments of meeting their carbon 
sequestration targets. 
The impact on additionality itself is worth note given that additionality is 
generally one of the key criteria in large scale programs directed at carbon 
sequestration, such as carbon credit schemes (Gustavsson et al., 2000). This 
model indicates that conservation efforts with higher cobenefits may achieve 
lower additionality at the margin due to the presence of positive reciprocal 
externalities. Thus the indirect effects that result from cobenefits should be 
considered when assessing the additionality of conservation mechanisms such as 
carbon credits. 
Above, each agency was assumed to have chosen a positive level of 
investment. Now consider the case where agency j ’s optimal choice is to invest 
zero (i.e., a corner solution where 0=jx ). When agency j  finds it optimal to not 
invest, there are no indirect effects if agency i  undertakes a marginal increase in 
its level of cobenefits. In this case, additionality is simply i
i
xf , and agency i  can 
undertake a marginal increase its level of cobenefits without having to increase 
expenditures to meet its original conservation goal (again this is assuming direct 
costs are zero). This is because marginal increases in the cobenefits do not trigger 
reductions in jx  on the part of agency j  because it is already at zero investment. 
Because agency j  is pushed toward a corner solution as agency i ’s 
environmental goal increases in size and when the cobenefits of agency i ’s 
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conservation efforts, j
i
xf , are larger, these are the conditions under which agency 
i  may be less likely to face disincentives to increase cobenefits from strategic 
behavior. 
The next step is to examine what incentives agencies have to reduce 
disbenefits of their conservation efforts. Here an interior solution where both 
environmental agencies choose positive investment levels is guaranteed. As in the 
case of cobenefits, I assume that there are no direct costs of decreasing disbenefits 
in order to isolate the impact of indirect costs that result from strategic behavior. 
Too see the incentives for decreasing disbenefits, refer to the additionality 
derived in equation (3). In this equation, agency i ’s marginal disbenefits are 
represented by j
i
xf . Because 0<
j
i
xf , by decreasing the magnitude of its 
disbenefits agency i  increases the additionality of it protection efforts. This is 
because when agency i  decreases its disbenefits, this allows agency j  to reduce 
its spending needed to achieve its own conservation goal, which in turn decreases 
how much 
iG  is compromised by agency j ’s protection efforts. This means that 
if agency i  decreases it disbenefits, it will also decreases the level of expenditures 
required to meet it original conservation goal. Thus in the presence of disbenefits, 
the environmental agencies actually have an incentive to decrease disbenefits 
because this decreases their cost of achieving their conservation goal. This is an 
established result for the case of negative reciprocal externalities (Cornes & 
Sandler, 1996; Sandler, 2004), but it has a useful interpretation in the case of 
disbenefits between environmental goods such as ecosystem services. It indicates 
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that the agencies may have some incentive to decrease their negative impact on 
the other environmental goods because indirect effects can reduce their costs of 
reaching the own environmental goal. 
 
A Specific Case for Illustration 
A specific example helps show these results more clearly. Suppose that the 
values of the environmental goods are linear in the protection efforts and take the 
following form jjiiji
ii xxxxfG =),(= , where 1,1)(ji  for 1,2=,iji  . 
This allows for the case of cobenefits (when the   terms are greater than zero) 
and the case of disbenefits (when the   terms are less than zero). To link this to 
the general model above, note that 1==
j
j
x
i
i
x ff , ji
i
j
xf =  and ij
j
i
xf = . In some 
cases this assumption of constant returns to scale may be a reasonable 
assumption, and in others it may not. For example, the value of carbon 
sequestered per dollar spent might be relatively linear because of the magnitude 
and spatial scale of the carbon emission problem. However, the values of many 
environmental goods (or proxies for these goods) accrue in a non-linear fashion 
(e.g, Barbier et al., 2008; Koch et al., 2009). Nevertheless, this assumption 
simplifies analysis and preserves the basic intuition. Relaxing the assumption of 
constant returns to scale would change the magnitude of the strategic response, 
however the signs of the responses would remain the same. 
This special case yields the following results: The best response functions 
are 
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 From these best response functions, the Nash equilibrium of this problem 
gives the expenditures required for agency i  to reach its conservation goal: 
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 Finally, from equation (3), additionality for this case is 
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In the case of cobenefits (when (0,1), ijij  ), ij  represents agency i ’s 
cobenefits. One can see the impact of agency i  increasing its cobenefits by 
looking at the marginal impact of ij  on agency i ’s expenditures and the 
additionality of agency i ’s protection efforts. The disincentive for agency i  to 
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increase its cobenefits is clear. Since 0>
*
ij
ix


, a marginal increase in the agency’s 
cobenefits will increase the cost of obtaining its environmental protection goal, 
iG . This is because the additionality of agency i ’s conservation efforts 
(protection achieved per dollar) decreases when it increases its cobenefits, which 
can be see by the fact that 0<
i
iji
xG  . 
In the case of disbenefits (when 1,0)(, ijij  ), ij  is agency i ’s 
disbenefits. As in the case of cobenefits, the impact of agency i  decreasing its 
disbenefits is given by the marginal impact of ij  on agency i ’s expenditures and 
the additionality of agency i ’s protection efforts. In this case agency i  has an 
incentive to decrease its disbenefits. This is because a marginal decrease in the 
agency’s disbenefits will decreases the cost of obtaining its environmental 
protection goal, 
iG  . This can be seen by the fact that 0<
*
ij
ix


. The agency’s 
costs decrease because the additionality of its protection efforts increases when it 
decreases its disbenefits, which can be see by the fact that 0>
i
iji
xG  . 
 
Conclusions 
The goal of this model was to examine the incentives that environmental 
agency might have to increase cobenefits or decrease disbenefits of their 
conservation efforts. It showed that in the case of cobenefits, an agency that 
increases it cobenefits may decrease the additionality of their conservation 
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investments and thus increase the costs required to meet their original 
conservation goal. Given that there are likely direct costs to increasing cobenefits 
as well (Venter et al., 2009; Nelson et al., 2008 ), the additional costs from 
indirect effects may provide a further disincentive for environmental agencies to 
provide cobenefits. This conclusion is especially relevant to conclusions drawn by 
Venter et al., (2009) about the prospect for increasing the cobenefits of the UN’s 
REDD program. They claim that because of non-linearities in the direct trade-offs 
among services, the biodiversity co-benefits of carbon sequestration efforts of 
REDD could be increased considerably without significant reductions in the 
amount of carbon sequestered (given a fixed conservation budget). However they 
only considered direct costs of increasing cobenefits (e.g., increased costs 
resulting from the need to purchase higher opportunity cost lands that are richer in 
biodiversity). As this model shows, there might be additional indirect costs due to 
strategic behavior on the part of other environmental agencies. These costs would 
further reduce the amount of carbon sequestered per dollar, meaning that the 
trade-offs between carbon sequestration and species conservation may be higher 
than they indicated. In addition, given the high priority of additionality in 
emissions reduction schemes, this model’s finding that increasing cobenefits 
could reduce additionality suggests that this issue may need to be considered in 
the context of programs like REDD and carbon credit schemes. In the case of 
disbenefits, the model indicated that reducing the level of disbenefits may actually 
allow the agency to increase the additionality of their conservation investments 
and decrease the costs required to meet their original conservation goal. Thus if 
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there are direct costs of decreasing disbenefits, indirect reductions in costs as a 
result of reducing disbenefits may help offset any direct costs. 
While the potential for these incentives ought to be considered, they will 
certainly not be present in all cases. As shown above, if agency j  is in a corner 
solution where they find it in their best interest to invest zero, the effects 
illustrated in this model would not be an issue for marginal changes in cobenefits. 
This is because there would be no strategic behavior resulting from a change in 
cobenefits given that agency j  is already investing zero dollars in environmental 
protection. If this were the case, an agency’s incentives would derive only from 
the direct costs of increasing cobenefits. 
This analysis is also limited by the assumption that the two agencies’ 
efforts will either be cobenefits or disbenefits. It is possible that the two agencies 
may not have externalities of the same sign. That is, one agency may have 
cobenefits where the other may have disbenefits. In this sense, the analysis here 
does not consider the full breadth of situations likely to be faced in reality. 
However, this model is general enough to consider this case, and so future 
analysis could focus on how results change if the assumption that externalities are 
of the same sign is relaxed. 
In summary, the value of this model is to illustrate how the nature of the 
production of environmental goods may result in reciprocal externalities between 
protection efforts. In the case of cobenefits, the positive reciprocal externalities 
may cause challenges for achieving successful management of multiple 
environmental goods in that they provide a disincentive to increase cobenefits. In 
  31 
the case of disbenefits, the negative reciprocal externalities may give agencies an 
incentive to decrease their negative impact on other environmental goods. These 
results provide some basic theoretical insights related to the management of 
multiple environmental goods when there are cobenefits and disbenefits of 
environmental protection efforts. 
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Chapter 3 
PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND POVERTY: TRADE-OFFS 
BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND POVERTY 
REDUCTION 
 
Summary 
This work models an environmental agency that would like to design a 
payments for ecosystem services (PES) program that simultaneously increases 
environmental protection and achieves development goals (e.g., poverty relief) for 
the program participants. The primary focus here is to examine inherent trade-offs 
between these two goals. The model indicates that in theory the trade-offs 
between these two goals may depend on relevant parameters of the system, 
particularly the ratio of the price of monitoring to participant’s compliance cost. I 
show that when the ratio of monitoring costs to compliance cost is higher, trade-
offs between environmental protection and poverty reduction are likely to be 
smaller. And when the ratio of monitoring costs to compliance costs is lower, 
trade-offs are likely to be larger. This analysis is done only for the case of a risk-
neutral landowner. 
 
Introduction 
There are an increasing number of payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
programs that are interested in both increasing environmental protection and 
  33 
improving the welfare of the individuals who participate in the program, 
particularly when these programs are located in less-developed countries and 
program participants are poor (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005; Pfaff 
et al., 2007; Wunder, 2008; Tallis et al., 2008). However, there is considerable 
debate surrounding whether or not this dual goal can be achieved and what trade-
offs exist between environmental protection and poverty alleviation. (Bulte et al., 
2008; Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002; Kinzig et al., 2011; Corbera & Pascual, 
2012; Kinzig et al., 2012). 
Much theoretical and empirical work has been focused on determining 
when these goals overlap. Wunder (2008) outlines four ways in which PES can 
impact the poor: (1) access to PES programs; (2) impacts on sellers of ecosystem 
services who are poor; (3) impacts on services users/buyers who are poor; and (4) 
indirect or derived effects such as impacts on food prices in local markets. If the 
poor are not able to participate in PES programs, this prevents them from 
receiving direct benefits from the programs unless they themselves benefit from 
the increase in environmental protection. For example, in Costa Rica’s PSA 
program, national law initially did not allow public funds to be paid to landowners 
who lacked a formal title even though their land tenure was secure. Since poor 
people were more likely to lack formal titles than wealthier farmers, this 
prevented many poor from participating (Pagiola et al., 2005). Other barriers to 
participation include factors such as higher transaction costs for enrolling poor 
landowners and the potential that poor landowners lack sufficient capital to cover 
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initial costs of participating (e.g., capital costs of afforestation plantations) 
(Pagiola et al., 2005; Pfaff et al., 2007). 
If the poor are able to gain access to the PES program, a primary issue is 
how much producer’s rent is captured by the poor landowner. If PES programs 
are in fact voluntary, it is reasonable to assume participants are receiving 
compensation equal to or greater than the production value they give up, making 
them at least no worse off than they would be in absence of the program 
(Zilberman et al., 2008), though it is possible that the PES program closes off 
future options to the landowner such as certain landuses. Indeed, in cases where 
participation has resulted in reduced income, such as the Sloping Land 
Conservation Program in China, it has turned out that the individuals involved 
were actually forced to participate (Bennett, 2008). The question then becomes 
how much economic rent is captured by the program participant. Wunder (2008) 
points out that “as in any commercial transaction, there is an inherent conflict 
over price between ES buyers maximizing consumer surplus (’biggest 
conservation bang for the buck’) and ES providers boosting their provider surplus 
(PES minus opportunity costs).” Information asymmetry is a key factor in 
determining how much economic rent poor participants are likely to capture. For 
example poor participants are likely to have disproportionate information about 
their compliance costs (relative to buyers). However, Pagiola et al. (2005) note 
that in some cases, the opportunity costs of upstream providers is likely easier to 
calculate than downstream user’s willingness to pay, which would reduce 
information rents by placing the producers in an inferior negotiating position. 
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Information asymmetry also arises if there is imperfect monitoring of program 
participants. Thus participants may stand to benefit if the agency is unable to 
perfectly monitor compliance with the terms of the PES contract. Sellers may also 
receive non-pecuniary benefits such as increases in human capital from training 
programs (Kerr, 2002; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005) and increases in land tenure 
security (Miranda et al., 2003; Robertson & Wunder, 2005). 
If the poor are the service buyers (i.e., those paying for the service), there 
is a risk that they will now be required to pay for benefits that previously were 
free. While this concern needs to be considered in each case, there are several 
reasons why those buying services are less likely to be poor: In practice many 
buyers are actually powerful monopsonies or oligopsonies (e.g., hydroelectric 
power companies); the poor generally hold less-developed land that is more 
strategic for service provision; several ecosystem services are considered luxuries 
(e.g., scenic beauty); and groups of poor potential buyers often do not have the 
coordination necessary to organize a payment scheme (Wunder, 2008). 
Nonetheless, there is still potential for costs to be passed on to poor users (e.g., 
prices for services that previously were free, increases in water prices in urban 
areas, etc.). 
Finally, indirect effects of conservation incentive programs on the poor are 
also possible. For example, land-use change such as afforestation or the transition 
of agricultural land back to natural habitat are likely to impact labor markets 
(positively or negatively) that provide jobs for the poor (Zilberman et al., 2008). 
In addition, increased vigilance and land-tenure security may impact the landless 
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poor’s access to resources such as non-timber forest product (Engel et al., 2005; 
Kerr, 2002). 
The work thus far on the potential for overlap between environmental and 
poverty reduction goals has provided some useful insight. It is clear that PES is 
not a silver bullet for reducing poverty. However, in light of the findings above, it 
is also clear that steps can be taken so that a PES program might be more likely to 
reduce poverty and avoid negative impacts on the poor. For example, Pagiola et 
al. (2005) notes that it is possible to design PES programs so that they do not 
exclude the poor, have positive effects on local labor markets (i.e., create jobs), 
and provide technical assistance or credit when required. However, these 
initiatives will almost certainly come at a cost, and would thus reduce the 
efficiency of achieving environmental protection. This highlights the need for 
further study of the trade-offs between environmental protection and poverty 
reduction in the context of PES. In particular this indicates a need for 
understanding how making PES programs more ’pro-poor’ will affect the 
efficiency of environmental protection effort. The theoretical model in this 
chapter is an attempt to fill this gap. I show how the behavior of the 
environmental agency might change when it increases its poverty reduction target, 
and how this might affect the costs required to meet a fixed environmental target. 
To do this, I build on work that models conservation incentive programs in 
the agri-environmental literature (representative examples include Choe & Frazer, 
1998; Choe & Frazer, 1998; Hart & Latacz-Lohmann, 2005). These papers use a 
principal-agent framework to model conservation incentive programs designed to 
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increase the production of environmental goods from agricultural landscapes. 
Examples of these programs include The English Countryside Stewardship 
Scheme, the French prime à l’herbe program and the German MEKA program. In 
most cases agri-environmental programs provide a financial incentive to farmers 
to undertake some costly restriction of production on their land. In this regard, the 
programs take a structure quite similar to PES. In the agri-environmental 
literature, many papers model a conservation agency endeavoring to achieve some 
fixed level of environmental protection at lowest cost. I build on this approach by 
adding an explicit goal of also increasing the welfare of the participating 
landowner. By increasing this poverty reduction goal, it is possible to examine 
how this changes the environmental agency’s optimal behavior and the costs 
required to achieve its environmental goal.
2
 
As noted above, PES can impact the welfare of the poor in many ways. 
This model focuses only on the pecuniary impacts on the participant’s welfare. 
This means that non-pecuniary impacts on participants (such as increases in 
human capital) and impacts on non-participants are not considered. Naturally 
these factors are also important in understanding the trade-offs between 
environmental protection and poverty reduction, however to make this analysis 
tractable, it is useful to focus on one dimension of the poverty impacts of PES. In 
addition, the pecuniary benefit from the incentive payment (net of compliance 
                                                 
2 Relatively few papers in the PES literature bridge the gap between the PES literature and the agri-environmental literature 
(exceptions include Ferraro, 2008, Zabel & Roe, 2009), so a secondary contribution of this work is to help bring useful 
modeling techniques and results from the agri-environmental literature to the PES literature. 
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costs) is likely to be one of the primary impacts on the welfare of the program 
participant. 
 
The Model 
Suppose an environmental agency wants to contract landowners to 
increase environmental protection. The landowners are currently engaging in an 
activity (e.g., agriculture, cattle grazing) which they will have to reduce (at a cost) 
in order to increase environmental protection. Thus the agency wants to design an 
appropriate contract to induce the landowners to undertake the costly reduction in 
their current activity. However the environmental agency would also like to use 
the program as a poverty reduction mechanism, meaning that it wants the program 
to simultaneously increase environmental protection and increase the welfare of 
program participants. Participants are assumed to be homogeneous and all below 
the poverty line. For example, this might be the case if the program is being 
implemented in a location where most landowners are poor. I assume that 
landowners do not derive direct benefits from the environmental improvements 
(or these benefits are negligibly small), which is likely to the case with many PES 
programs such as those focused on sequestering carbon to mitigate climate 
change. 
In order to achieve these goals, the agency creates the following contract: 
The contract stipulates that the landowners must dedicate a set effort level, e , 
which increases environmental protection (e.g., more biodiversity protection, less 
run-off, etc.). If the landowner complies and supplies this effort, the landowner 
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will receive a transfer payment, t . However, if the landowner is detected putting 
forth an effort level lower than e , she will not receive the payment t . 
Assume for simplicity that the landowner has only two possible effort 
levels. She supplies either e  or no effort at all. As noted above, supplying effort 
decreases the land owner’s profits from outside activities (e.g., agriculture, raising 
cattle). For the sake of simplicity, I assume that landowners are homogeneous 
with respect to their outside earning opportunities and their compliance costs. In 
reality this is not likely to be the case, and many papers examine the case of 
heterogeneity of compliance costs (and related issues of adverse selection) (for 
examples see, Ferraro, 2008; Moxey et al., 1999; Wu & Babcock 1996). 
However, assuming homogeneous landowners permits the convenience of 
modeling a contract with a representative landowner, which is the approach taken 
here. If the landowner does not participate, she receives o , her reservation wage. 
And if the agent participates and supplies the required effort, e , her profit from 
outside activities is reduced to  , where o < . Thus her compliance cost for 
the program is  oc = . I assume that this compliance cost is known to the 
environmental agency, meaning that there are no problems of adverse selection.
3
 
That is, the landowner cannot hid her compliance costs in order to request a 
higher compensation payment. In the real world it is certainly possible that 
compliance costs would not be known, as indicated in Ferraro (2008). However, 
Pagiola et al. (2005), claim that because PES programs usually involve a change 
                                                 
3 Naturally asymmetric information about compliance costs is another way that landowners can increase the amount of 
producer’s rent they capture. In the future it could be fruitful to do a joint model that focuses on both adverse selection and 
moral hazard. However for now I focus only on information rents captured by the landowners as a result of imperfect 
information about actual landowner compliance. 
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in land-use (e.g., leaving land fallow), it is often relatively easy to calculate the 
opportunity cost to poor landowners of participating in the program.
4
 
This model assumes that the incentive payments offered by the program 
are fixed payments (e.g., a fixed payment per acre enrolled in the program, etc.). 
Since landowners are assumed to be homogeneous with respect to landholdings 
and compliance costs, the total payment size is identical across landowners. This 
is because the agency chooses a single payment size that is optimal for inducing 
compliance by all landowners in the program. Fixed payments are the standard in 
PES programs (Pattanayak et al., 2010) and agri-environmental programs (Hart & 
Latacz-Lohmann, 2005), though in real programs the total payment size may vary 
across landowners. This could be the case, for example, if one landowner enrolls 
more land in the program than other landowners. 
This model also assumes that there are no fines levied on a landowner who 
violates the terms of the contract. Fines are not an uncommon feature of 
conservation incentive programs in the developed world and models in the agri-
environmental literature frequently include them as one of the available tools for 
inducing compliance (e.g., Ozanne, Hogan & Colman, 2001; Hart & Latacz-
Lohmann, 2005). However, in this model I assume that the environmental agency 
does not have this option. This is because the landowners in this model are 
assumed to be poor, and it is probably politically unacceptable to levy a fine on 
individuals who are already poor. This is consistent with the design of many PES 
                                                 
4  Note that I assume there is no uncertainty associated with the landowner’s outside profit earning activities. In reality 
there is likely to be uncertainty associated with these earnings, especially because these will probably include agricultural 
activities where weather and crop prices create uncertainty. In the risk neutral case, this assumption is essentially 
unimportant because 
o  can just be considered the expected earnings from outside activities. However, if risk aversion 
were introduced, this assumption would require more attention. 
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programs in developing countries (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Pattanayak et al., 
2010). In the absence of a fine, the only punishment available to the 
environmental agency is to withhold the payment if the landowner does not 
supply effort. Because there are only two effort levels, e  and zero effort, this 
means that the worst off the non-complying landowner can be is back to her 
reservation wage, o . 
It is worth noting that in some cases, it may not even be politically feasible 
to require the landowner to return the incentive payment. In these cases a more 
realistic model would have as the penalty for non-compliance the lost gains of 
future participation in the program. Indeed this is in line with many PES programs 
today where individuals found in non-compliance are restricted from participating 
in the program in the future, or are restricted from reentering the program for a 
certain number of years (Pattanayak et al., 2010). This dynamic approach is more 
consistent with models such as those found in the efficiency wages literature (e.g., 
Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984). However, for now I maintain a static model for the sake 
of simplicity. 
Naturally the landowner has an incentive to participate in the program but 
not supply the costly effort. As a result the agency monitors in order to detect 
non-compliance (e.g., they monitor the landowner’s activities, the level of the 
environmental good, etc.). The probability of the landowner being found in non-
compliance depends on whether or not she supplies effort. If the landowner puts 
forth full effort, e , she will never be found in non-compliance. This means that if 
she complies with the contract, she will receive the payment t  with certainty. 
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However, if the landowner violates the contract and does not increase 
environmental protection (i.e., shirks), the principal can only detect this violation 
with some probability, q , where [0,1]q . The accuracy of detecting contract 
violations, q , depends on how much the agency invests in monitoring activities. 
In this sense, q  can be interpreted as the level of monitoring effort, where 0=q  
is no monitoring effort and 1=q  is the level of monitoring effort needed to detect 
contract violations with one-hundred percent accuracy. As is often done in the 
agri-environmental literature, I make two simplifying assumptions regarding the 
accuracy of detecting contract violations: (1) The agency can directly choose the 
accuracy of detecting contract violations, meaning that it directly chooses q ; and 
(2) expenditures increase proportionately in the accuracy level chosen (Choe & 
Frazer, 1998; Choe & Frazer, 1999; Ozanne, Hogan & Colman 2001; Hart & 
Latacz-Lohmann, 2005). Suppose that the cost to the environmental agency of 
monitoring a landowner is qpq , so that qp  is the price of full monitoring. 
The assumption that a complying landowner will receive the payment, t , 
with certainty reflects the fact that the burden of proof for identifying 
compliance/non-compliance is most appropriately placed on the environmental 
agency when the landowners are poor. Other authors modeling agri-
environmental programs have taken different approaches. For example, Choe and 
Frazer (1998, 1999) assume that the environmental agency’s imperfect 
information results in an inability to identify both non-compliance and 
compliance. That is, the environmental agency identifies the landowner’s 
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behavior correctly with some probability. However this implies that even if the 
landowner complies with the contract there is a positive probability that she will 
be found in non-compliance. Ozanne, Hogan and Colman (2001) suggest that this 
may not be an appropriate way to characterize imperfect monitoring, and that a 
more realistic approach is one where the burden of proof rests on the 
environmental agency. To capture this, they characterize imperfect monitoring so 
that the monitoring process fails to detect all landowners who do not comply, but 
landowners who fulfill the terms of the contract are never found to be in non-
compliance. I assume that this latter characterization is more appropriate for PES 
programs where participants are poor because political norms are likely to be 
strongly against inadvertently punishing poor participants who have complied 
with their contracts. 
In this model I will assume that the landowner is risk-neutral. Thus the 
utility for the risk-neutral landowner who chooses not to participate is 
o
declineU =  and the utility for the landowner who chooses to participate and 
supply effort can be represented as ctU o
comply = . Her expected utility if she 
chooses to participate but supply no effort is oo
shirk qtqU   ))((1= . 
Because the environmental agency would also like to use the program as a 
poverty reduction mechanism, the agency also wants those individuals who 
participate and comply with the program’s objective to receive welfare gains from 
their participation. To formalize this, suppose that the agency has a poverty 
reduction goal for the landowner that is represented by =UU comply  , where 
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declineUU = . Note that because these are weak inequalities, this allows for a 
case where the agency has no poverty reduction goal (i.e., when o = ). 
The agency then is faced with the task of how to choose the incentive 
payment level and monitoring level in order to induce the landowner to supply 
effort, while simultaneously achieving its poverty reduction goal. Below I set up 
the agency’s problem for a risk-neutral landowner. From this problem one can 
derive several results, including the optimal incentive payment and monitoring 
level, the expenditures required to achieve the desired environmental protection, 
the shadow cost of poverty reduction, and the producer’s rents. 
As stated above, the environmental agency’s goal is to minimize 
expenditures while meeting its environmental constraint and poverty reduction 
constraint. Thus its problem is,  
 
 qptE q
qt
=min
,
 
 oo ctCPts  ....  
   ctRP o..  
 ooo qtqctCI   ))((1..  
 
(8) 
The structure of this model captures the agency’s interest in achieving 
multiple policy objectives. While its primary goal is to minimize costs, it must do 
so while also satisfying several constraints that represent its multiple policy 
objectives. The first and third constraint represent the environmental policy 
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objective. The first constraint is a participation constraint (P.C.), which requires 
that the payoff to the landowner exceed her compliance costs. This ensures that 
the landowner would actually participate in the program. The third constraint is 
the incentive compatibility constraint (I.C.). This requires the payoff of 
participating and supplying effort to be at least as high as the payoff of 
participating and shirking. It ensures that the participating landowner supplies the 
environmental benefit. The second constraint, the “poverty reduction constraint” 
(P.R.), represents the agency’s poverty reduction objective. It ensures that the 
complying landowner is made better off by the program. In order to solve this 
problem, first note that because o  , if the P.R. is satisfied, the P.C. is always 
satisfied, meaning that the P.C. can be ignored. Indeed if o =  (i.e., the agency 
has no poverty reduction goal), then the P.R. constraint is identical to the P.C. The 
optimal levels of t  and q  can be found by solving the Lagrangian below. 
 
 ]))([(1][= ctqtqctqptL ooooq    (9) 
 
The Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions are,  
 0=1= qLt    
 0== tpL qq   
 0=0,0,=   LctL o   
 0=0,0,=   LcqtL   
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These conditions provide several results that will be useful for examining 
the questions put forth at the beginning of the chapter. First, note that the I.C. 
constraint will always bind at the solution because it is never cost efficient to use 
more incentive payment or monitoring than necessary to induce compliance. 
However the P.R. may or may not bind because the information rents captured by 
the landowner may exceed the poverty reduction goal. Whether or not the P.R. 
constraint binds depends on the parameters of the problem. As a result, it is 
convenient to denote when the P.R. constraint is binding and when it is non-
binding. To do this define s  to be a vector of parameters that is (  ,,, oq cp ) and 
S  to be the set of all possible parameter vectors. Now define 'S  as the set of 
parameter vectors for which the P.R. constraint will be binding. Thus the P.R. 
constraint is binding when 'Ss , and the P.R. constraint is non-binding when 
'Ss . Using this, the optimal incentive payment and monitoring level are 
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And the expenditures required to reach the environmental goal and poverty 
reduction goal simultaneously are, 
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(12) 
   
The Lagrangian multiplier of the P.R. constraint,  , has a useful 
interpretation. It is the shadow cost of poverty reduction, which shows the 
marginal cost to the agency of increasing its poverty reduction goal while still 
achieving its environmental goal. Because such increases in expenditures would 
result in less money available for spending on conservation (e.g., less money for 
enrolling more landowners in the program),   indicates the degree of trade-offs 
between environmental protection and poverty reduction. The value of   is, 
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Finally, because we are interested in the welfare of the landowner, another 
useful result is the producer’s rent, which I’ll denote B . It is, 
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Recall that the goal at hand is to see how a poverty reduction constraint 
will affect the optimal behavior of the environmental agency and to see how this 
translates into trade-offs between environmental protection and poverty reduction. 
Given this goal, a useful heuristic is to begin with the case of an agency that has 
no poverty reduction goal, and then examine the impacts of the first marginal 
increase in poverty reduction. To do this we can start by evaluating the results 
above for o  . This provides the results of the agency’s problem if it is 
seeking only to achieve the environmental goal (by inducing compliance) at 
lowest cost. This can be used to determine how the first marginal increase in the 
poverty reduction will affect the environmental agency’s cost of achieving its 
environmental goal, and when there may be trade-offs between environmental 
protection and poverty reduction. It is useful to start with the first-best scenario as 
a point of reference. 
 
First-best Scenario 
Consider the first-best scenario for an agency with no poverty reduction 
goal. In this case there is no information asymmetry (alternatively this can be 
viewed as monitoring being costless). As a result, the incentive compatibility 
constraint collapses to the participation constraint, meaning that the agency 
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simply chooses the minimum level of incentive payment so that the P.R. 
constraint is satisfied. This means that in the first-best scenario, the P.R. 
constraint will always be binding. This yields ct o =)=(
*  , 1=)=(* oq  , 
cE o =)=(  , 1=)=( o  and 0=B . Because the landowner receives zero 
producer’s rent in this case, if the agency wants the program to increase the 
landowner’s welfare, it must increase the size of the incentive payment. This can 
be seen by the fact that 0>1=*t . However, because ct =  and 1=q  represent the 
efficient incentive payment and monitoring level for achieving environmental 
protection, this means that when the P.R. reduction goal increases, this causes the 
environmental agency to depart from the efficient equilibrium for achieving only 
environmental protection. This departure from the efficient levels of t  and q  
means that any effort to increase the landowner’s rent will come at a cost to the 
environmental agency, indicating that there are trade-offs between the two goals. 
Another way to view this is that increases in the poverty reduction goal cause a 
decrease in the amount of environmental protection achieved per dollar. This can 
be seen by the fact that the shadow cost of the first marginal increase in poverty 
reduction is positive. Indeed, because 1=  in the first-best scenario, the cost of 
increasing the amount of poverty reduction achieved by the program is essentially 
the same as a program that simply provides financial handouts to the landowner 
without tying them to the provision of an environmental good. In other words in 
the first-best scenario, a dollar increase in the welfare of the program participant 
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(beyond their reservation wage) is a foregone dollar that could have been spent on 
more environmental protection by enrolling more landowners in the program. 
 
Second-best Scenario 
In most cases, however, monitoring is likely to come at some cost to the 
environmental agency (Choe & Frazier, 1998, 1999; Hart & Latacz-Lohmann, 
2005). Therefore, one must consider the trade-offs between environmental 
protection and poverty reduction in the context of a second-best world where 
information about compliance is costly, and there exists moral hazard. This is a 
relevant case because moral hazard may allow the landowner to capture 
information rents. In the second-best case, where there is a positive price of 
monitoring, it is no longer clear whether or not the P.R. constraint will bind. 
Because the results above depend on whether or not the P.R. constraint is binding 
or non-binding, it is useful to determine under what conditions the P.R. constraint 
is binding ( 'Ss ) and non-binding ( 'Ss ). If we denote NBt*  as the optimal 
incentive payment when the P.R. constraint is non-binding, then the P.R. 
constraint will be binding whenever ct o
NB <* , that is when 
ccp oq <)(
1/2
. Thus when the environmental agency has no poverty 
alleviation goal (when o = ), this condition states that the P.R. constraint is 
binding when cpq < . 
First consider the second-best scenario for an agency with no poverty 
reduction goal where the P.R. is binding, i.e., when cpq < . Here the results are as 
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follows: ct o =)=(
*  , 1=)=(* oq  , qo pcE =)=(  , 
c
pq
o 1=)=(   
and 0=B . In this case the landowner still does not capture any producer rent 
when the agency has no poverty reduction goal. As a result, if the agency wants 
the program to increase the landowner’s welfare, it must alter the levels of 
incentive payment and monitoring. This can be seen by the fact that 0>*t  and 
0<*q . This means that when cpq < , the first marginal increase in the poverty 
reduction goal causes the agency to increase the size of the financial incentive and 
decrease monitoring. However, as in the first-best scenario, this represents a 
departure from the efficient levels of incentive payment and monitoring for 
achieving just the environmental goal at lowest cost. As a result, the shadow cost 
of the first marginal increase in poverty reduction is also greater than zero, 
indicating trade-offs between environmental protection and poverty reduction. 
However, note that the shadow cost of poverty reduction is less than in the first-
best scenario, meaning that when there is a positive price of monitoring and 
cpq < , the trade-offs are smaller than in the first-best scenario, and that the trade-
offs decrease as the ratio of the price of monitoring to compliance costs increases. 
Now consider the second-best scenario for an agency with no poverty 
reduction goal where the P.R. is non-binding, when cpq > . Here the results are as 
follows: 
1/2* )(=)=( cpt qo , 
1/21* )(=)=( cpq qo
 , 1/2)2(=)=( cpE qo , 
0=)=( o  and ccpB q 
1/2)(= . Here the landowner does capture some 
producer’s rent even though the agency has no poverty reduction goal. As a result, 
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for the first marginal increase in the poverty reduction goal, the agency need not 
alter its incentive payment and monitoring levels from the levels that are efficient 
for obtaining environmental protection at lowest cost. This can be seen by the fact 
that 0=*t  and 0=
*
q  in this case. As a result the shadow cost of the first 
marginal increase in the poverty reduction goal is zero. This apparent lack of 
trade-offs is due to the fact that the efficient behavior for meeting the 
environmental goal at lowest costs already produces positive producer’s rents. 
Note that this result is only for the first marginal increase in the poverty reduction 
goal (above zero). As the magnitude of   increases, the P.R. constraint may 
eventually bind, resulting in a positive shadow cost of further poverty reduction. 
Summarizing these results, we can see a relationship between the shadow 
cost of the first marginal increase in the poverty reduction goal (an indication of 
the trade-offs) and the ratio of the price of monitoring to the compliance costs. In 
the first-best scenario, the ratio of qp  to c  is zero (because monitoring is costless) 
and 1=)=( o . In the second-best scenario where cpq <<0 , it was shown 
that   is between zero and one. Finally, in the second-best scenario where where 
cpq > , it was shown that 0=)=( o . This suggests that the initial trade-offs 
between environmental protection and poverty reduction are highest when the 
ratio of qp  to c  is lowest, and that the trade-offs are lowest when the ratio of qp  
to c  is highest. The reasoning behind this result is as follows. As the price of 
monitoring increases, the agency prefers to use higher incentive payments and 
lower monitoring levels to induce compliance. This results in higher information 
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rents captured by the landowner. However, if compliance costs are higher, the 
landowner has a higher incentive to shirk, which in turn increases the value of 
information (about compliance) to the environmental agency. As a result, it is the 
ratio of these two parameters that is important in understanding the initial trade-
offs between environmental protection and poverty reduction. 
 
Conclusions 
These results suggest that there are situations where environmental 
protection efforts may be more conducive to including a dual goal of poverty 
reduction, and others situations that may be less conducive to this dual goal. The 
model indicates that this is linked to the ratio of the price of monitoring, 
qp , to 
the compliance costs, c . When the price of monitoring is high relative to the 
landowner’s compliance costs, trade-offs between environmental protection and 
poverty reduction are likely to be smallest. And when the price of monitoring is 
small relative to the landowner’s compliance costs, the trade-offs are likely to be 
largest. 
A relevant question is which parameter values exist in the real world, and 
thus which level of trade-offs are environmental agencies are likely to face. 
Unfortunately, in empirical work on PES, these parameter values are typically not 
reported (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005). While empirical information about these 
parameter values would be ideal, it seems reasonable that there would be 
considerable variation in these parameters across different PES programs in the 
real world. Consider first the price of monitoring. For some environmental 
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protection efforts, monitoring may be relatively inexpensive. For example, if the 
incentive program’s goal is to maintain forested lands to secure carbon 
sequestration, remote sensing can be used relatively effectively to track whether 
participants have maintained their forest cover (though the issues of enforcement 
costs and verification that landowners are to blame for losses would also play a 
role here, and this should be considered). In contrast, some other conservation 
efforts such as those that target specific endangered species may have higher 
monitoring costs (e.g., a need for on-the-ground surveying of the species 
population by trained biologists). It is also likely that compliance costs would 
vary depending on factors such as the requirements of the contract, the 
productivity of local soil conditions, etc. Naturally, even given variation in these 
parameters, the correlation between the price of monitoring and the compliance 
costs would be important to know. However, with the sparse attention they have 
received in the empirical literature, this cannot be determined. 
While information about real world parameters is scarce, these results still 
provide some insight about how changes in the capacity of agencies to monitor 
would affect the trade-offs between environmental protection and poverty 
reduction. For example, Pattanayak et al. (2008) note that the price of monitoring 
in carbon sequestration schemes is decreasing as remote sensing technologies are 
becoming more effective. This would suggest that for PES programs designed to 
increase carbon storage, the trade-offs may become higher over time as monitor 
capacity improves. This is especially interesting because efforts to sequester 
carbon represent one of the largest (if not the largest) source of funding for 
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conservation incentive programs in the developing world. Indeed, the UN’s 
proposed REDD program, which is likely to be implemented in the form of many 
“PES-like” projects (Pattanayak et al., 2008), would involve an unprecedented 
transfer of conservation dollars to developing countries (Venter et al. 2009). 
This model also suggests that our growing understanding about ecosystem 
service production functions may be a relevant consideration for assessing trade-
offs. In this model the parameter 
qp  is very general, however many factors 
contribute to the price of monitoring. If the PES program verifies compliance by 
monitoring the output of the environmental good (as is suggested by Roe & Zabel, 
2009), one of the factors likely to influence the price of monitoring is the level of 
understanding the environmental agency has about the ecosystem service 
production function. If the agency has a poor understanding of the production 
function, it is likely that it will be more difficult (and thus more costly) to detect 
contract violations. On the other hand if the agency has a better understanding of 
the production function, this would likely decrease the price of monitoring 
because it would be easier to detect a violation. This suggests that as knowledge 
about ecosystem service production functions increases, this may result in higher 
trade-offs between environmental protection and poverty reduction. 
In conclusion, the results from this model are quite limited in that PES 
programs have the potential to impact the welfare of the poor in a variety of 
different ways; this model focuses only on the income gains that result from the 
incentive payment. Nonetheless, the model points toward some areas where it 
may be good to focus attention in determining the trade-offs between 
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environmental protection and poverty alleviation in the context of a PES program. 
It also suggests a need for greater attention to measuring relevant parameters such 
as the price of monitoring and compliance costs as these may be useful in 
empirical assessments of trade-offs for real-world programs. 
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Chapter 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The context in which environmental protection efforts take place is 
complex, both biophysically and socially. This complexity often means that 
multiple policy goals are unavoidably linked. It would be simpler if 
environmental protection efforts could focus on one problem at a time. However, 
biophysical, social and political contexts rarely make that feasible. This thesis 
focused on two such cases that are receiving considerable attention in the 
literature: (1) the desire to manage multiple environmental goods simultaneously 
and (2) the desire to use payments for ecosystem services programs to alleviate 
poverty. The goal of the thesis was to provide some general insights about which 
situations might be most conducive to achieving multiple policy objectives and in 
which situations there are likely to be trade-offs. 
Chapter two addressed the issue of cobenefits and disbenefits produced by 
environmental protection efforts. There is much work directed at identifying 
where there are cobenefits and disbenefits, but little work examining the 
incentives environmental agencies actually have to provide them. The basic 
accomplishment of this model was that it highlights how the nature of the 
production processes of environmental goods may result in reciprocal 
externalities between environmental protection efforts. These externalities 
represent social feedbacks that affect the incentives environmental agencies face 
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vis-à-vis increasing cobenefits and decreasing disbenefits. In the case of 
cobenefits, the model indicated that if agencies increase their cobenefits, this may 
decrease the environmental protection achieved per dollar, making it more costly 
to reach their original environmental goal. Many mapping exercises have 
illustrated how it may be possible to undertake protection efforts that achieve 
larger cobenefits, however whether agencies will actually choose such protection 
strategies needs to be considered in light of their incentives to do so. This model 
suggests that theoretically they may face some disincentives to take such a path. 
In the case of disbenefits, the model indicated that agencies may in fact have 
incentives to decrease disbenefits because this could increase the environmental 
protection achieved per dollar and reduce the cost of achieving their original 
environmental goal. In summary, the direct cost of altering cobenefits and 
disbenefits levels have received the majority of the attention in the discourse 
surrounding cobenefits and disbenefits. This chapter argued that indirect effects 
that result from reciprocal externalities should also be taken into consideration 
when managing for multiple environmental goods in the presence of cobenefits 
and disbenefits. 
The model in the third chapter was directed at the current interest in using 
PES as a poverty alleviation mechanism. The model illustrated a PES program 
where the agency running the program also had a poverty reduction goal. This 
allowed the trade-offs between the two goals to be explicitly examined by 
deriving the shadow cost of poverty reduction. The model showed that the initial 
trade-offs between the two goals hinges on the ratio of the price of monitoring to 
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the compliance cost. These results must be qualified by the fact that the welfare of 
the landowner is likely to be influenced by a wide variety of program-related 
impacts (e.g., increased land-tenure security, increased human capital from 
capacity training, etc.). Nonetheless, the income transfer is likely to be a large 
component of the welfare impacts a PES program. By explicitly including both of 
these goals, this model provides a starting point for theoretical models examining 
trade-offs between the goals of environmental protection and poverty reduction in 
the context of a PES program. 
The theoretical models in this thesis generate hypotheses that future 
empirical work could test. In the second chapter, the model indicates that agencies 
may have an incentive to decrease cobenefits and reduce disbenefits. This results 
in two hypotheses. In the presence of cobenefits (i.e., when there are positive 
reciprocal externalities between environmental protection efforts), agencies will 
reduce the degree to which their conservation investments supply cobenefits. The 
second hypothesis from this chapter is that in the presence of disbenefits (i.e., 
when there are negative reciprocal externalities between environmental protection 
efforts), agencies will reduce the degree to which their conservation investments 
produce disbenefits. 
In the chapter three, the model indicates that the trade-offs between 
environmental protection and poverty reduction depend on the parameters of the 
system, particularly the price of monitoring, the compliance cost and the size of 
the poverty reduction goal. One particularly relevant hypothesis that these results 
generate is that as the price of monitoring increases, the trade-offs between 
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environmental protection and poverty reduction will decrease (assuming other 
parameter values are held constant). In order to carry out an empirical test of this 
hypothesis, it could be fruitful to examine multiple projects within one agency 
that vary in the price of monitoring and their impact on participant welfare, but 
which have relatively similar compliance costs. In this way one could examine 
whether changes in the price of monitoring affect the degree to which participant 
welfare is increased by the program. 
In both chapters, the models indicate potential challenges to achieving 
additional policy goals on top of the environmental agency’s original 
environmental protection goal. In chapter two, increasing cobenefits resulted in 
higher costs of reaching a fixed environmental goal. In chapter three, increasing 
the poverty reduction goal often came at a cost to the environmental agency. 
However these two chapters also showed that in some cases, environmental 
agency might be more likely to achieve multiple policy goals. In chapter two this 
was the case where the agencies had an incentive to decrease disbenefits; and in 
chapter three this was the case where parameter values were such that the efficient 
protection of the environmental good resulted in positive rent for the landowner, 
even in the absence of a poverty reduction goal. In conclusion, these models do 
not provide any specific policy advice; they are simplistic and too general. But for 
the two cases presented in chapter two and three, they do provide some general 
guidance for where attention might be focused as we assess the challenges of 
achieving the multiple policy goals that arise from the context in which 
environmental protection efforts take place. 
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